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THE

DRAMATIC AND MIMETIC FEATURES

OF THE

GORGIAS OF PLATO

BY

BARKER NEWHALL, M. A.

A DISSERTATION PRESENTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

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PREFATORY NOTES.

(1). The proportion of participation is (excluding formulae of question and answer, and direct quotations) for Socrates $77\frac{1}{8}$ per cent; Callicles $14\frac{1}{7}$ per cent; Polus 4 per cent; Gorgias $31\frac{9}{10}$ per cent; Chaerephon .78 per cent.

(2). For the genuine dialogues, to Teuffel's list were added the *Io*, *Menexenus*, and *Parmenides*.

LITERATURE.

Gorgias.—Besides Foss (1828), Blass, *Attische Beredsamkeit*² (pp. 47–91), 1887, and Diels (Berlin Acad. 1884); Schanz: *Beiträge zur vorsokrat. Philosophie aus Platon*, I, 1867.

Socrates: van Heusde: *Characterismi principum philosophorum veterum*, 1839; Köchly: *Socrates und sein Volk, Vorträge* (219–386), 1859. (See also pp. 22, 24.)

Plato: Olympiodorus: *Πράξεις περὶ τοῦ Γοργίου*, Jahn's Archiv, XIV 47 ff.; van Prinsterer: *Prosopographia Platonica*, 1823; Hirzel: *Das Rhetorische bei Platon*, 1871; Novák: *Platon und die Rhetorik*, Jahrb. Phil. Sup. XIII 443 f.; Bénard: *Platon historien de la Sophistique*, Acad. Sci. Mor. (p. 338 f.), Paris, 1885.



THE DRAMATIC AND MIMETIC FEATURES OF THE GORGIAS OF PLATO.

INTRODUCTION.

The great mimetic and dramatic powers of Plato were recognized by the ancient world. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (ad Pomp. I) says *κωμῳδεῖ τοὺς πρὸ ἑαυτοῦ . . . Γοργίαν καὶ Πῶλον κτλ.*, and elsewhere (Rhet. X 2, XI 6) alludes to his skilful *ἡθοποιία*, while Basilius Magnus,¹ citing three of his characters, writes *παρακωμῳδεῖ τὰ πρόσωπα*. Olympiodorus opens his commentary with the remark *οἱ φιλόσοφοι . . . εἰσάγουσι πρόσωπα διαλεγόμενα . . . καὶ ἐξ ὧν φέγγονται τὰς ζῶας χαρακτηρίζουσιν*, and adds that Socrates strengthens (*κρατύνει*) the speech of Calicles that he may not gain an empty victory. We know from the same authority that Plato was a close student of the mimes of Sophron and of Aristophanes, to whose influence were due the mimetic features of his dialogues. The division of his works into tetralogies by Thrasyllus, and into trilogies by Aristophanes of Byzantium, also bears witness to the general feeling. Modern criticism has more than confirmed the judgment of antiquity. We admire the solemn tragedy of the *Phaedo* as well as the bright comedy of the *Protagoras*, while the graceful introduction to the *Phaedrus*, the rhetorical parody of the *Menexenus*, and the wonderful microcosm of the *Symposium* all show the touch of a master hand. Indeed, only in his latest and most metaphysical dialogues do we wholly miss the dramatic coloring, which adorns alike his maiden essay and his maturer work. So real do the characters seem that we feel with van Heusde that while others wrote Socratic *dialogues*, Plato alone composed *mimes*.

The dramatic and mimetic art of Plato has been quite fully treated by von Stein, and Taine has done some clever work in this field by his essay "*Les Jeunes Gens de Platon*," while commentators and critics, notably Steinhart, have incidentally alluded

¹ Epist. 135, v. K. O. Müller: *Gesch. Griech. Literat.* II 221, n.

to its more apparent manifestations. The *μίμησις* of the Symposium has been discussed by Professor Gildersleeve and others, and judging from the title "Charakterbilder aus Protagoras," a certain Mayr of Komotau has devoted a program to similar study in that dialogue. The merry satyr-drama, the Euthydemus, and the great tetralogy,¹ the Republic, with their wealth of finely-drawn characters, would well repay special investigation, and the more juvenile interludes, Lysis, Laches, Charmides, would not be without interest. Dramatic analyses of the Phaedo by Suckow, and of the Republic by Bacher deserve mention. Whether the purpose of dramatic form be merely external ornament, or the reinforcement of argument and the vivifying of principles, matters less to the student of literature than to the philosopher. We must bear in mind that the dialogue, even when most artistic, is only *analogous* to the drama, and in many matters of detail the resemblance is often partial or faint. Still more important is the *typical* nature of Platonic *μίμησις*. His own principle is stated in the Republic (396 E) *σμιχρόν τι μέρος ἐν πολλῶ λόγῳ τῆς μιμήσεως*, and he deprecates the imitation of evil characters, unless for sport (l. c. D and E). The characters are generally few, in accordance with antique precedent, and their delineation is not allowed to distract attention from the purpose of the work. They are representatives of intellectual and moral tendencies, and so the lines are drawn more subtly than for the mere individual. For the same reason only certain features are emphasized, and the result is often more or less one-sided. Professor Gildersleeve has noticed that, when the space is limited, the portraiture is coarser and more exaggerated, and so Prodicus and Thrasymachus stand in bolder relief than Protagoras and Gorgias. "Simple, fine and intensive" is the verdict of von Stein, and this fresh and delicate *ῥθοποτία* would alone justify his title of "Homer of philosophers." Well does van Heusde say "*risum nobis . . . excitat Lucianus, haud secus atque Aristophanes, in Platone legendo . . . subridemus.*" In a word, where the quality is fine, the quantity is small. *One* drop of the honey of Hymettus, *one* note from Apollo's swan, may fitly shed their sweetness over an entire life.

In the Gorgias the earnestness of thought and intensity of feeling exclude the brilliant decoration of the Protagoras, yet the art of the master is far from lacking. No Platonic dialogue, says

¹(1) Satyr-drama, Thrasymachus, Book I. (2) *Πόλις*, II-IV (p. 427). (3) *Ἀνήρ*, IV-VII. (4) *Δικαιοσύνη*, VIII-X (p. 612)—*ἔξοδος* (612-621).

Steinhart, so closely resembles a tragedy in its lofty pathos of language and in its basic thought—man's presumption opposed to God's eternal law. The allusions to the approaching death of the chief actor (486 B, 511 B, 521 C), and to the heroism of his life (473 E), are like the expressions of double meaning which so often foreshadow the catastrophe of a Greek tragedy, and of which the Oedipus Tyrannus affords the best example. These premonitions find peculiar expression in an ironical form (521 E), when Socrates parodies his own trial by the instance of a physician who is accused by a confectioner before a court of boys. The abundant irony and word-play as well as the occasional oxymoron are also characteristic of tragic diction. Köchly has drawn a skilful parallel between the Antigone and the life of Socrates, and thus we see that Plato had before him a tragic life to inspire his drama. Moreover, it has been shown that the dialogue falls into five parts, corresponding to the five acts of a tragedy. They are: (I) the *πρόλογος* (chap. 1-15); (II) the first episode, or *πρώταις* (16-36); (III) the second episode, or *ἐπίταις* (37-54); (IV) the third episode, or *μετάβασις* (55-78); and the *ἐξοδος* (79-83). The first and second episodes are suitably marked by the entrance of a new character, and the third by the partial retirement of the second actor. The only vestiges of the stasima are the summaries of the argument made by Socrates at the close of each episode (480 E f., 500 A-D, 522 C-E), the last showing some poetic fervor. The *parados* is still less apparent. A faint trace may be found in the intermezzo at chap. XIII, where serious and positive discussion is really introduced for the first time. The preceding chapters merely define the sophistic position, the internal principles, as the short proemium (chap. I) presents the characters and scenery, the external features of the drama. The progress of argument follows the lines of development of a tragic plot, so that in the last act all the previous discord of passion grows into purest harmony. Here, too, the gods appear upon the scene, like so many *dei ex machina*, and the myth, in its function of exodus, as in the Republic, "points the moral," as well as "adorns the tale." The final chapter, like the solemn anapaests, sums up the whole thought of the drama, and closes with a personal exhortation. The chorus, as an integral part of the action, steadily decreased in importance, and in Euripides and the latest works of Aristophanes it occupies comparatively little space.¹ Here it

¹ v. Haigh: Attic Theatre, 259-261.

is only represented by the silent audience, to whom allusion is often made (447 C, 55 C, 73 E, 90 B), and whose expressions of interest are indicated by *θύρυβος* (458 C). Chaerephon is evidently its coryphaeus. He assumes its mediating functions, evinces its fussy interest in the action, and has a like fondness for the wise saw and trite maxim, but he lacks the lyric beauty of their speech. In accordance with the rules of the drama, he is on the side of the protagonist, who is, as in all but the latest dialogues, Socrates himself. Callicles is the deuteragonist, while Gorgias and Polus, who represent one and the same stage of the discussion, together assume the rôle of the third actor.

We may notice the artistic placing of the first word, *πολέμου*, which indicates the nature of the dialogue, and the pathetic position of the last word, *Καλλίχλειε*, which is quite consistent with the prominent part that he plays.¹ It is well to notice that tragedy, not comedy, was Plato's model in economy, nor, on the other hand, does the Gorgias lend itself very readily to a comparison with the Pindaric ode.² The asymmetry which the Terpanidian system of analysis produces is objectionable in Plato as well as in Pindar, while the myth here, moreover, is at the close, not in the centre. The third act resembles the *ἄγών* of the comedy and the *ὑμφολός* of the ode merely in its position as the crisis of the action and the kernel of the thought of the whole dialogue. Further comparison would be fanciful. In regard to the mimetic features of our dialogue, Bénard remarks that the persons are "avec précision caractérisé, chacun a son langage, sa manière d'agir." To demonstrate the validity of this claim and to examine the phenomena upon which it is based, the investigation embodied in this essay has been made. If it has contributed, however slightly, to a clearer insight into the art of Plato, it has fully achieved its purpose.

GORGIAS.

Gorgias, like other sophists, busied himself with the study of Homer. He put Homer after Musaeus, and he compared the neglecters of philosophy to the suitors of Penelope. Moreover, he wrote encomia of Achilles and Helen, and a defense of Palamedes. Very appropriately, then, almost his first words are *ὦ γέ*

¹ Cf. *θεός*, Apol., Crito (fin.), Leg. (init.): *πολιτικόν*, Polit. (fin.): *Περσῶν*, Aesch. Pers. (init.): *stelle*, Dante, Infer., Purg., Parad. (fin.).

² Cf. Suckow, 501 ff.

εὐχομαι εἶναι, ὥς ἔφη Ὁμηρος (449 A), a phrase which recurs some twenty times in the great epic. Then, too, his εἰπέ, μηδὲν ἐμὲ αἰσχυνθείς (463 A) may be a reminiscence of μηδὲ τί μ' αἰδόμενος μειλίσσαιο (γ. 96). In 450 B we meet with two words which Olympiodorus tells us are Sicelisms (Γοργίας αὐτὸς ἀπ' ἐκείνου προφέρει τὰς λέξεις ἐγχωρίους οὖσας), while he notes that Socrates uses κύρος. χειρουργημα occurs only here, and κύρωσις elsewhere only in Thucyd. and Josephus. The former may easily have taken the word from his master, and Josephus from the present passage. This seems to be the only place in this dialogue where the local peculiarities of the speakers are reproduced, but, like the ἴττω Ζεὺς of Cebes in the Phaedo (62 A), a little dialectic color is given, and the reader is left to complete the picture. So the Doric forms sprinkled through the chorus of the tragedy satisfied the Athenian mind with a hint of the lyric, of which Doric was the type.

Besides dignity and conceit (449 A, C, 51 D, 55 D, 63 D) we may note the lofty condescension of 451 A and 455 D. He is the teacher, and Socrates the pupil, a delusion which the latter encourages by his modesty (e. g. μανθάνω, 450 D). His offer to answer all questions (448 A) is known to be historic,¹ and a sample of his skill in eluding inconvenient queries is seen in 448 D. So the Scholiast on 458 B says Δέδοικεν ὁ Γοργίας καὶ φεύγει τὴν διάλεξιν, αἰτιᾶται δὲ τοὺς παρόντας πανούργως ὥς οὐκ ἀνεξομένους. To this trickery we may compare his evasion of the famous *bean* puzzle,² as proposed to him by this same Chaerephon. Perhaps the most apparent imitation of Gorgias' style put in his own mouth is found in 452 E. Notice first the chiasm of beginning and ending, πείθειν . . . λόγοις and λέγειν καὶ πείθειν, recurring at the close to the theme of the little speech. Then the paronomasia of ἐν δικαστηρίῳ δικαστάς κτλ., and the allied *figura etymologica* in χρηματιστής . . . χρηματιζόμενος, with the anaphora of δοῦλον, as of ἄμα (D), and the isokola of the sentence. The word δοῦλον, with its semi-poetic idea, is taken directly from Gorgias himself, for Protarchus (Phileb. 58 A) has often heard his master claim that rhetoric πάντα ὑφ' αὐτῇ δοῦλα . . . ποιοῖτο. This delicate epitome of style closes with a pathetic apostrophe, σοὶ τῷ δυναμένῳ (cf. Blass, 69). Mark also the unnecessary fulness of expression and repetition of ἐν ξυλλόγῳ, ὅστις ξύλλογος and of ἄλλῳ καὶ οὐχ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ σοί. This professional padding is still more abundant

¹ Cf. Philostratus, Vit. Soph. p. 482K.

² Cf. l. c. p. 483K.

in the longer speech (456 A–57 C), where indeed it is the chief peculiarity. The phrase οὐ δεῖ τοὺς διδάσκοντας μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων (6 E) is later (7 B, C) twice repeated almost word for word; so τῇ ῥητορικῇ χρῆσθαι ὥσπερ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀγωνίᾳ (6 C) recurs in part in the next clause, and again nearly entire (7 B); so οὐ τοῦτου ἕνεκα (6 D); χρῶνται οὐκ ὀρθῶς (7 A) is resumed just below by οἱ μὴ χρώμενοι ὀρθῶς; περὶ οὗτου—πιθανώτερον—ἐν πλήθει (6 C) finds its echo in πιθανώτερος . . . ἐν τοῖς πλήθεσιν περὶ οὗτου (7 A); ἐκεῖνοι παρέδωσαν ἐπὶ τῷ δικαίως χρῆσθαι (6 E) appears slightly changed in 7 C. The σχῆμα κατ' ἄρσιν καὶ θέσιν of ἀμυνουμένων, μὴ ὑπάρχοντα (7 A) shows the same tendency. Besides these verbal repetitions, the thought, which one sentence would have expressed, is repeated positively and negatively with slight variations throughout the speech. Notice, too, the rhetorical and emphatic position of the adverb ὀρθῶς at the close of the sentence (7 A twice), of which usage in Demosthenes Rehdantz gives many examples, and to which Thucydides, Gorgias' pupil, is not averse.¹ Antitheses are common, though inartistic, and are expressed by ἄλλος, ἀλλά and οὔτε—οὔτε. This speech has its real proem in 455 D and E.f.

This same fullness of expression is seen in occasional periphrases, of which his extant speeches afford examples (v. Blass 65). So the partitives ἔναι τῶν ἀποκρίσεων (449 C) and τὸ τῶν παρόντων (458 B) exemplify a usage, which another pupil, Isocrates, was later to extend and mould into a characteristic formula. The phrase τοὺς λόγους ποιῆσθαι (449 C) might be added, though Socrates has it as well (460 E), and τὸ τῆς τέχνης (450 C) also, where they are perhaps necessary for philosophic exactitude of definition. However, they are not uncommon periphrases, and here merely show a general tendency, which is once more manifested in the addition of καὶ δικαίως ὑπολαμβάνεις (451 E). On the other hand, a careless form of brachylogy appears in ἐκ τῶν (for τῆς τῶν) δημιουργῶν (455 E). We know from Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (189, 20 Röm.) that irony was a characteristic of Gorgias, though Aristotle refers it to the use of poetic ornament. Blass (63) cites the story of the swallow. In our dialogue the interposed οἶμαι (460 A) and the protest to Calicles (497 B), πάντως οὐ σὴ αὕτη ἢ τιμὴ, show this feeling. Some consider the latter phrase to be a proverb, but its *application* would show irony quite as well, and it is doubtful if the dignified old gentleman would descend to the vulgarity of a proverb, even though Protagoras and Hippias do

¹ v. Classen : Einleit. 79.

use a few. It has been noted¹ that the Helen has very few particles, hence is epideictic, while the Palamedes has a great variety and the favorite oratorical combinations, and so is forensic. Here only two places can fairly be called speeches by Gorgias. The former (452 E), a declamatory glorification of rhetoric, has only the common particles *καί*, *καίτοι*, *ἀλλά*, *μέν* and *δέ*, so is epideictic, as its more artistic form and ornament would lead us to expect. The latter (456 A-7 C), an endeavor to *prove* the power of the art by instance and argument, has 16 different particles and combinations of particles, hence is forensic. In the matter of oaths a quiet *νῆ Δία* or *μὰ τὸν Δία* (448 A, 63 D, 73 A) is all that the two sophists use.

The periodology of Gorgias is very simple, and, owing to the use of his peculiar figures, is dual, antithetic, and composed of short kola. Our dialogue shows but little *strong* antithesis, and the duality is only apparent in a few places. The best cases are 452 E, 456 A-C, and 456 DE *οὐδέ γε—πόλεων*. Often it is very simple, but a more complicated arrangement is seen in (457 A) *οἱ δὲ μεταστρέψαντες | χρῶνται τῇ ἰσχύι | καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ | οὐκ ὀρθῶς*, where the second and third kola are parallel, and, less clearly, the first and fourth, so *ὑπότερον* (56 C), *ὁρᾷς ὅτι* (56 A); also as in (452 E) *καίτοι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει | δοῦλον . . . ἱατρὸν | δοῦλον . . . παιδο-
τρίβην || ὁ δὲ . . . οὗτος | ἄλλω . . . χρηματιζόμενος | καὶ οὐχ αὐτῷ*, where in each period the second and third kola are coordinate, but *together* parallel to the first; so *καὶ εἰ* (457 C). The only tricks of speech which are not used by master or pupil are long compounds, bold metaphors, and the artistic asyndeton, which is probably intended by the *ἀπόστασις* and *προσβολή* of Philostratus. Out of these, however, Callicles employs the bold metaphors, and shows *some* asyndeton, while Socrates has one long compound, *καταψευδομαρτυρηθείη* (472 A), which may parody this trait of the sophist.

The whole delineation of Gorgias is marked by great moderation, and the aged Nestor (Phaedr. 261 C) is treated with the utmost respect by Socrates. So it remains for his younger followers to show the exaggeration of his style and the extension of his principles, and to receive the brunt of the attack. He is said, on reading this dialogue, to have assured his friends, rather needlessly, that he never said anything of the sort, to have exclaimed *ὡς καλῶς Πλάτων οἶδε λαμβάνειν* (Athen. XI 505), and to have styled

¹ Jahrbuch. f. Philol. 103, 442.

him a new Archilochus. It has been thought¹ that Aristophanes parodied Gorgias in the *Birds*, while he attacked him indirectly by the caricature of his pupil, Agathon, in the *Thesmophoriazusae*, but in neither case is the parody as apparent as here. Besides the famous travesty in the *Symposium*, the *Menon*, a sort of prelude to the great tragedy, begins the attack through the pupil, who voices the ideas of his master² and stands in his stead.

POLUS.

This model pupil is far inferior to his master in depth of mind, and cannot follow the course of dialectic, but must be repeatedly corrected and instructed. He disrespectfully pushes ahead of Gorgias, accuses Socrates of ill-breeding, and is altogether rough, impetuous and arbitrary. This may be seen by such expressions as τί δὲ τοῦτο, ἐὰν σοί γε ἱκανῶς (448 A), ἀγροικία (461 C), ὁπόσ' ἂν βούλωμαι (D). Impatience is shown by φάθι (462 D twice) and καὶ ἀπόχριναι (3 E), and conceit by ἀληθῆ γε οἰόμενος (473 B). The short speech 448 C is an excellent example of exaggerated Gorgiasm. The paronomasia, homoioteleuton, isokolon, and allied figures are apparent to every one. The word αἰῶνα affords an instance of the poetic diction with which Gorgias embellished his writings, and the rare use of *πορεύεσθαι* seems affected. The unusual position of the vocative at the head of the sentence may impart a certain dignity. Except in some half-dozen cases, it seems to open in Plato a longer and more formal speech. This piece is regarded by most scholars (after Schol. R.) as a verbatim extract from Polus' own *τέχνη*, since Socrates mentions (462 B) having read the term *ἐμπειρία* in that book, and since Hermogenes cites the first part, Aristotle the last, as Polus'. However, the allusion of Socrates is merely to the *one* word, and the citation of Hermogenes may be, as Sittl suggests, from this very place in Plato. Blass thinks that only the first sentence is an extract, while the rest is in the idea, but not the form, of Polus.³ The case is not so certain, then, as is generally considered, and it seems at least quite possible that the fine mimetic artist has here made as bold a parody of Gorgianic style as he did in the *Symposium*. The comment of Olymp., ὁ Πῶλος θεατρικῶς προφέρει τὸν λόγον,

¹ Süvern: Üb. Ar. Vogel, 25-35, 47-55 (Av. 465-625, 1685; Vesp. 419).

² Meno, 71 D to 72 A, 82 A; v. Taine, p. 180; Schanz, 120 f.

³ P. 83: "was Platon ihn . . . weiter sagen lässt."

seems to indicate that he recognized its dramatic nature. As an epideictic speech, it shows poverty of particles. We may notice that Hirzel thinks *γυμνάσιον* (493 D) may be an *εἰχονολογία* (Phaedr. 267 C) from the above-mentioned *τέχνη*.

His abrupt *entrée* (461 C) presents the only ¹ case of decided anacoluth used by the three interlocutors, who thus show their careful rhetorical training in marked contrast to the conversational familiarity of Socrates. Keck ² would emend away this case, but it is clearly due to the excitement and impatience seen in the hyperbaton of *ἄγειν . . . τοὺς λόγους* and of *μὴ* in *ἐὰν μὴ ἔλθῃ ταῦτα εἰδώς*. The alliteration *ἀγαπᾷς, αὐτὸς ἀγαγῶν* seems almost too striking to be accidental. Polus followed his master in the study of Homer, and wrote a catalogue of the ships and a genealogy of the heroes (Suidas), so the word *σχέτλια* (467 B) and the phrase *ἐχθρὸς καὶ πρῶτος* (470 D; cf. B 305) may be epic reminiscences. The irony, which Gorgias shows here so slightly, is very apparent with Polus (v. p. 10), and he is only second to Socrates in its use. A second characteristic speech is given 471 A-C, with its pompous prelude in 470 D (cf. 455 D), which calls forth the comment of Olympiodorus, *ρήτορικώτερον ἐκτίθεται*. It is a good instance of the apodeictic use of the narrative, and its abundant and combined particles (as *ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ*, A, and *τοιγάροι νῦν*, C) witness its forensic nature. The proem is A, the narrative proper B to the middle of C, and the epilogue the remainder. The speech opens with a rhetorical question (cf. 473 B), an artificial position, which is avoided by the most effective and earnest orators. Indeed, this figure, so abundant in the Palamedes of Gorgias, is such a pet weakness of Polus that he introduces it twice into his attempted dialectic (466 A, C), and Socrates ridicules it by pretending to regard it the opening of an oration (*ἐρώτημα τῇ λόγου ἀρχήν*, l. c.). The strong and vivid terms, *καταμεθύσας, ἐμβάλων, ἀπέσφαξεν, ἠφάνισεν, ἀποπνίξας*, as the accumulated tortures in 473 B-C, exemplify *αὔξεις*. Cicero (Brut. 47) tells us that "*rem augere laudando, vituperando adfligere*" was a specialty of Gorgias, and Olymp. (on 473 C) says *τὰς συμφορὰς αὔξων*

¹ Cron, in his note on 483 DE, *ἐπεὶ ποίω—τοιαῦτα λέγειν*, says "Das zusammenfassende Glied tritt aus der Konstruktion," but this is really a rhetorical aposiopesis. Callicles impatiently cuts short the proposed arguments, *ποίω—ἐστράτευσεν* and *ὁ πατήρ—Σκίθας*, and leaves them both incomplete. This is lively, but artificial, like the question (*ποίω*), which is a favorite Gorgianic opening (cf. pp. 9, 12).

² Jahrbuch. f. Philol. 83, 412.

διηγείται. Similarly the jerky apposition of υἱόν, ἀνεψιόν, ἡλικιώτην (B) and of ἀδελφόν, υἱόν, παῖδα (C), as δεσπότην καὶ θεῖον (A), heaping one relationship upon another, with the three-fold repetition of Ἀλκίτης and the stem of δουλος (A), all very strongly emphasize the guilt of Archelaos. The bitter irony all through these speeches (as χαλεπώτερον, ἴσως, 473 B; ἀθλιώτατος, ἴσως, 471 C) also contributes to this effect. The name of the subject of the ἔπαινος is artistically made the last word of the speech, as both Gorgias and Isocrates put Helen's name in the last sentence of their encomia.¹ Finally the heaped-up participles denote the heaped-up guilt, though they mar the intended apodeictic force of the speech.² The ratio of finite verbs in the narrative is 13 to 8, and, excepting the first finite verb, we have a curious artistic grouping:

2 4 2 4 2 4 2
pp, pppp | ff, pfpf | ff, pppp | fp.

The verbs of 473 B-C show like symmetry:

2 2 3 2 3 2×3 2
pf | pp, fff | pp, fff | pf, pf, pf | pp.

The quieter proem (471 A) has the opposite ratio, 1 to 8, while the epilogue shows a more even balance. The little speech (473 B-C) has its proportionately short proem and epilogue, πῶς λέγεις; and τὰτα λέγεις κτλ. The fullness of expression seen in Gorgias is found in the pleonasm ἄρτι, τοῦτου πρῶσθεν (467 B). One of Gorgias' precepts was εἰ ὁ ἐναντίας σπουδαῖα λέγει, γέλα καὶ ἔχρουν αὐτόν (Olymp.), and so Polus employs this device of his master (473 E).

Teichmüller³ notes that Polus uses the answer πῶς γὰρ οὐ; five times in 475 B-8 C, and suggests that it may represent the Thesalian culture of Gorgias' school. Callicles uses it seven times, Gorgias three. Socrates has it twice, but it may be a mocking echo of the sophists. Moreover, it is twice employed by the imaginary objectors introduced by Socrates, who must be counted as a part of the outside world. Excluding Socrates, the total is .143 to the page. In order to see how far this form of answer is sophistic in its tendency, all the dialogues of Plato have been examined, and the cognate forms πῶς δ' οὐ; and πῶς γὰρ ἄν; also

¹ Cf. Isaeus 5, Lys. 26—near the end—Lyc., Dem. 22, Thuc. I 43, VI 87, etc.

² v. Am. Journ. Philol. IX 146.

³ Literarische Fehden, II 321.

noted. It does not appear in the Apol., Tim., Criti., Symp., Prot., Io, and Menex. Socrates uses it once in the Euthyd. and Crat., twice in the Gorg., and thrice in the Rep. Four persons use it more often than .10 to the Teubner page: (1) Theaetetus in the Soph. (.23; $\pi\omega\varsigma \delta' \omicron\upsilon$; .14); (2) Thrasymachus in the Repub. I (.21; for actual participation, .32); (3) Protarchus in the Phileb. (.16), and (4) Aristotle in the Parm. (.12 $\frac{1}{2}$; for actual participation, .16 $\frac{3}{4}$). The first was a disciple of Theodorus, and he of Protagoras, the second (Phil. 58 A) and third either pupils of, or strongly influenced by, Gorgias, while of the last we only know that he was one of the Thirty. Three of these, then, point clearly to sophistic influence, while the fourth, being otherwise unknown, and appearing in a dialogue of doubtful genuineness, renders testimony neither pro nor con. Though the Thessalian theory of Teichmüller finds no support, we infer that this answer in the Gorgias may be one of the finer mimetic touches of our author. Lysis (.16 $\frac{3}{4}$) and Alcibiades in Alc. I (.20) have been excluded, the former dialogue being too short, the latter spurious.

POLUS AND CALLICLES.

These two pupils of Gorgias exhibit interesting differences and similarities of language and demeanor, and some of the more important cases may be briefly noticed. At their entrée each has the same idea in his mind, but Polus is rough and excited (461 B, cf. p. 9), while Callicles politely turns to Chaerephon first, and is cool and calm to Socrates (481 BC). Accordingly, Polus receives no explanation and is silenced with little ceremony, but Callicles is allowed to make a long speech, after Socrates has graciously explained his position. Both accuse the philosopher of trickery (461 C, $\epsilon\iota\varsigma \tau\omicron\iota\alpha\upsilon\tau\alpha \acute{\alpha}\gamma\epsilon\iota\nu$; 482 E, $\epsilon\iota\varsigma \tau\omicron\iota\alpha\upsilon\tau\alpha \acute{\alpha}\gamma\epsilon\iota\varsigma$), and depreciate Gorgias with the same phrases (461 B, $\eta\sigma\chi\upsilon\nu\theta\eta$ — $\epsilon\nu\alpha\nu\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha \lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\iota\nu$ — $\delta \delta\eta \acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\pi\acute{\eta}\varsigma$; 482 D, $\alpha\iota\sigma\chi\upsilon\nu\theta\eta\nu\alpha\iota$ — $\epsilon\nu\alpha\nu\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha \epsilon\iota\pi\epsilon\iota\nu$ — $\sigma\acute{\epsilon} \delta\epsilon \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron \acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu$). Polus attempts *dialectic*, of which he is clearly incapable, and begins before he knows Socrates' position, while Callicles makes a long and able speech, after ascertaining his opponent's views. The former starts too soon and is at once interrupted, the latter waits till the proper time. Polus advocates the right of the stronger in crude and revolting language (466 C, 471 A–C, cf. p. 9, 473 B $\sigma\tau\omicron\epsilon\beta\lambda\omega\tau\alpha\iota, \kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\pi\iota\tau\tau\omega\theta\eta \kappa\tau\lambda.$), and uses a coarse barbarian as an example, Callicles in specious terms ($\phi\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ vs. $\nu\acute{o}\mu\omicron\varsigma$) and poetic phrases ($\acute{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\phi\acute{\alpha}\nu\eta, \epsilon\zeta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\alpha\mu\phi\epsilon\nu$), and cites Pindar and Euripides

(482 A-486 D). The answers of Socrates indicate the contrast, *μυρμολύττει αὖ* (473 E) to the one, *εἰ χρυσὴν ἔχων . . . τὴν φυγὴν* (486 D) to the other. Polus uses the wrong verb, *Ἀρχέλαον ὀρᾷς* (470 D), Callicles the right one, *θεμιστοκλέα ἀκούεις;* (503 C). Both allude to the many possible examples (470 D, *οὐδὲν . . . δεῖ παλαιοῖς πράγμασιν*: 483 DE, *ἄλλα μυρία ἄντις ἔχου λέγειν*), but one dwells on his tyrant's crimes, the other passes quickly from Xerxes to the more distant Darius. Both begin with a rhetorical question (471 A, 473 B; 491 E), but Callicles answers Socrates first; both treat their opponent with scorn (470 C, 491 E, 495 D), and show great confidence (473 B, 474 B; 488 D, 495 C), though the general tone of Callicles is firmer (*πάνυ σφόδρα ἔλεγον, ἐγὼ σοι σαφῶς λέγω*). Both use the *reductio ad absurdum* (473 E, cf. 474 B: 481 C), and both show embarrassment: Socrates twice asks Polus *τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνεις;* (468 D, cf. 474 C, D 3 times), and says *ἀποκρίνῃς* (515 C, cf. 509 E) to Callicles after three unanswered queries, and finally has to answer himself. For similar expressions cf. 466 A, Socr. to Polus, *τηλικούτος ὢν* (defensive), and 489 B, Callicles to Socr., id. (offensive): 468 E and 499 B, *ὥς δὴ σὺ*: 471 E, *δοκεῖ σοι ὥς λέγω*, and 495 B, *καὶ γὰρ σὺ*: 473 C, *διαφυγὼν τύραννος καταστῆ*, and 484 A, *διαφυγὼν . . . ἀνεφάνη δεσπότης*: 473 A, *ἄτοπα ἐπιχειρεῖς* (cf. 480 E), and *ἄτοπος εἶ*, 494 D; 467 B and 489 B, *οὗτος(ί) ἀνὴρ—σχέτλια λέγεις* and *οὐ παύσεται φλυαρῶν*. Socrates uses irony only playfully with Polus, and attacks personal weaknesses (461 B, 470 D), but very keenly with Callicles to combat logical errors (as 490 C-E, 494 C-E). He gives each two examples, to Polus prosaic incidents in his own life (469 D, 474 A), to Callicles poetic myths from the philosophers (492 E-4 A).

CALLICLES.

As Gorgias represents the theory of rhetoric, and Polus its technique, so Callicles its practical application; or, as Jahn puts it, Gorgias is positive, Polos comparative, Callicles superlative. He is, as already shown, quite the most skilled antagonist of the three in logical thought and energetic expression, and he exceeds in the length of his main speech any Platonic interlocutor, excepting Protagoras and the speakers of the Symposium and Republic. His independence of action is shown by his frequent attacks upon Socrates (489 B, E, 490 DE, 97 A, 505 D, 511 A, 15 B, 21 B), his sophistic changing of ground (489 C, 91 A, 99 B), his frequently

restricted assent (495 A, 501 D, 13 E, 14 A, 16 B, D) and his refusal to continue the discussion (505 D). Olymp. compares him to Sisyphus, who pushes forward the stone and then draws back. He might have added that it is the overpowering weight of the Socratic elenchus which compels Callicles to retreat. He is clearly none of those lay-figures which appear so universally in the Platonic dialogues.

The rhetorical influence of Gorgias appears in the artistic assonance, *ἐπαίνους ἐπαινοῦσιν καὶ ψόγους ψέγουσιν* (483 B) *βελτιόνος τε καὶ χρεῖττονος . . . χειρόνων τε καὶ ἡττόνων* (484 C), *νόμον τε καὶ λόγον καὶ ψόγον* (492 B), *Ἔστω τοῦτο οὕτω* (504 A); in the bold metaphors, *διαρρήξας . . . καταπατήσας . . . δεσπότης . . . ἐξέλαμψεν* (484 A), *πλάττοντες* (483 E), *συμποδισθεῖς, ἐπεστομίσθη* (482 E), *πόρρω φιλοσυφίας ἐλαύνοντας* (486 A), and similes (483 E, 99 B): in the rhetorical questions (491 E, 2 B, C), and the alliteration *πείθου, παῦσαι . . . πραγμάτων* (486 C). Under this head may be classed the cases of hyperbole (*μυρία* 483 D) and catachresis (*βίος* 486 D). The sophistic criticism and adaptation of the poets is seen in quotations from Homer and Pindar, but especially from the rhetorical Euripides, selections from one of whose *ρήσεις* are skilfully woven into Callicles' own argument (485 E, 86 BC). Though thus dependent on Gorgias, he is also a man of the world, and approaches to the simpler style of Socrates in his *litotes* (513 C), slight cacophony (*ἐγὼ λέγω* 484 B), careless hyperbaton, *φύσιν . . . γενναίαν* (485 E), his use of proverbs (447 A, 505 C, 21 B) and *figura etymologica* (8). Here also may be placed his asyndeton (483 C, E, 484 A, 489 B), though, as we have seen (p. 7), a more artistic form might be ascribed to the contact with Gorgias. The massing of four (483 E) and six (84 A) participles at the most brilliant part of his long speech, crowded as it is with poetic tropes and bitter scorn, reminds us of the exploits of his predecessors. At 458 C, Schol. O. notes that Chaerephon desires the continuation of the discussion, because it is *profitable* (*προὐργιαιτερον*), but Callicles, because it is *pleasant* (*ἡσθην*). So he says *ἐπιθυμῶ Σωκράτης* (447 B), but the latter answers *βούλομαι* (Olymp.).

The fact that our knowledge of Callicles is limited to this dialogue has caused various speculations upon his identity. That Plato has been considered not averse to the employment of pseudonyms may be seen in Teichmüller's¹ identification of Lysias with Dionysodorus, a character whose reality Grote and Schaar-

¹ Literarische Fehden, I 30 ff.

schmidt had already doubted. Indeed, Cicero (Leg. I 15) thought that the ξένος of the Laws was Plato himself, and the Eleatic strangers in the Sophistes and Politicus are certainly shadowy characters. Steinhart and Stallbaum consider Callicles a typical Athenian of his time, and van Prinsterer treats him as historical, while Bénard expresses doubts as to his real existence. Gotschlich held that he represents Isocrates, not in traits of character so much as in the expression of Isocrates' views, while he is forced to draw conclusions which the orator would never draw. However, this is even more true of his relation to Gorgias, and he could only in a very general way represent *two* people. Schmelzer has a curious theory that the three interlocutors are the three accusers of Socrates, Gorgias being Lykon, Polus Meletus, and Callicles Anytus. He bases it chiefly on certain correspondences in the last pair, which he sets forth at the end of his Gorgias and in his Menon (pp. 50, 52, 58, 60, 62). They are both wily politicians and easily angered, alike condemn the sophists and warn Socrates of his fate; but Callicles is friendly, an aristocrat and cultured, while Anytus is hostile, low-born and ignorant. Moreover, Callicles calls the accuser of Socrates πάνυ μοχθηρὸς καὶ φονὴλος (521 C). The most plausible view, which identified him with Critias, was proposed by Cron in his Beiträge (1870), but he abandoned it in 1886, apparently under the criticism of Bonitz.¹ The similarity is, however, so very strong that it deserves notice. Jowett (II 275) remarks, "had his name been Critias instead of Callicles, his opinions would seem to reflect his life," and K. O. Müller, Zeller, Blass and others class their views together, making them with Thrasymachus a trio of sceptics. This collocation is as old as Themistius (Or. 26 fin.), and Olymp. often notices the connection with Thrasymachus. This even extends to language, such expressions as κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις and ἡδὸς εἶ, beside πῶς γὰρ οὐ; above noted, being common to both, while they uphold the right of the stronger in like terms (483 B, Rep. 338 E). All three came under the instruction, or direct influence, of Gorgias. To the striking points of likeness adduced by Cron a few others may be added. Callicles is contradictory and changeable in his opinions (p. 14) and in his public life (481 E), a character quite like that of Critias (Cron 19). The defense of πλεονεκτεῖν (Cron 17) is also seen in Xen. Hellen. (II 3, 16), where Critias joins

¹ Jahrb. f. Philol. 133, 579. Now (141, 253) he calls Callicles' speech an *echo* of what Plato had heard Critias say.

πλέον ἔχειν and ἀρχή as Callicles here (483 D). In dialectic both change ground and withdraw their statements (Char. 164 D, 165 B), and object to Socrates' method of treatment (Char. 165 E, 166; Gorg. 497 A, 511). Very little is known of Critias' style, and only scanty fragments of his works remain. A certain similarity of idea is seen in the metaphor of Callicles, συμποδισθεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις . . . ἀσχυνθεῖς (482 E) and the line αἰδοῦς ἀχαλκεύτοισιν ἔξευκται πέδαις (598 N.), from the Peirithous, which K. O. Müller and others ascribe to Critias. Callicles' approval of Alcibiades and Cimon was shared by Critias (Eleg. 3-5, Hist. 9). The fact that ψευδομάρτυς (472 B) only occurs (until Plutarch) in Critias (Trag. 9 N.) and in 472 B, is probably a mere coincidence, unless Socrates intends it to be a compliment to the poet.

CHAEREPHON.

Olympiodorus devotes especial notice to the position and functions of Chaerephon. He says that he is ὀρθόδοξος, and is used by Socrates as an example of πῶς ἐπιστήμονες γίνονται καὶ διαλέγονται, but is not essential to the discussion. He is, moreover, a medium between the two sides, διαπορθμεύει, and so, having had a previous acquaintance and rencontre with Gorgias (p. 5), he questions him in the place of Socrates (447 C). He uses a proverb, ἐγὼ καὶ ἰάσομαι (448 B), to match the preceding, as Socrates had matched the proverb of Callicles, and turns the latter's own phrase, οὐδὲν οἶον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν (447 C), into an answer to the host himself (481 B). So Socrates (p. 18) in his replies embodies the phrases of his opponents. In fact, as in Aristophanes' Clouds, he is the model Socratic pupil, and is the counterpart of Polus. He is more respectful to his master, and shows his skill in understanding Socrates by *one* example, while Polus needs many, and even Gorgias *two* (449 D). A touch of his master's irony appears in ῥαδίως ἀποκρινεῖ (448 A), and he addresses *both* Gorgias and Socrates (458 C), though the latter wished to continue the conversation. In 458 C he may have had in mind the line of Pindar, ἀσχολίας ὑπέρτερον πρᾶγμα, which was probably a favorite quotation of Socrates (v. Phaedr. 227 B). Here we may also note his *figura etymologica* (458 C, 448 C), which, considering the small part that he takes, is a large proportion. In the opening of the Charmides he justifies the epithet of μανικός, as his subordinate position here does not allow him to do, and he occupies a like intermediate and introductory position.

SOCRATES.

I.—*His Personality.*

In approaching the character of Socrates we are at once confronted by the difficulty of distinguishing the peculiarities of the author in language and thought from those of his master. While Xenophon and Aristotle may help us to extract the thought, they leave us for the most part unaided in our study of the language. We might look to the *Clouds* of Aristophanes, but there the parody seems to be confined to method and doctrines. Those figures and modes of expression which occur throughout the Socratic dialogues (as given by Zeller), and which agree with our knowledge of the character of Socrates, may with a good degree of certainty be considered dramatic reproductions of reality.

The most prominent and characteristic of these is the irony, demanded by the special earnestness, plain speaking and hard hitting of the philosopher. To cite all the cases in the *Gorgias* would be to transcribe half the dialogue. It is sometimes quite apparent, often keen and subtle, now a polite veil for dissent, now a powerful engine of destructive criticism. Perhaps the most pungent examples are the retorts to Polus, *ἀλλά τοι ἐξεπίτηδες κτλ.* (461 C), and *ἀλλ' ἀκούω γε* (470 D). Closely akin to this is *litotes*, which is well suited to the mock modesty of the philosopher. Whether it carries a positive meaning directly and clearly, or makes simply a qualified statement, its *form* at least seems more modest. It is most frequent in Xenophon and Plato, and this may be due to the influence of their common master. Four of the five cases of *οὐδὲ πᾶν* are used by Socrates, as is also *οὐκ ὀλίγη* (461 B). So playful and genial does he always seem that we are justified in considering peculiar to himself the occasional play upon words, as the two *δῆμοι* (481 E, cf. 513 B), *ἐναντίον* and *ἐναντία* (487 B), *λόγου* and *λόγον* (523 A), *Ἀιδου* and *ἁειδές* (493 B). *πίθον*, *ἄμυνήτους* and *σῶμα* are borrowed (493 A). This sportive fancy is exemplified also in pompous legal expressions like *Καλλικλῆς δ' Ἀχαρνέως ἔφη* (495 D), *τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ* (51 B), *σύμψηφος* (500 A, cf. 501 C), 506 C, and in the mock solemnity of the patronymic *ὁ Κλεινίστιος* (482 A). So is the use of *antonomasia* (482 B), and *oxymoron*, *διὰ τὸ ἀισχύνεσθαι τολμᾷ* (487 B). In this same familiar tone are used the proverbs. Dorian in their character and origin, as is seen by their frequency in Epicharmus and Sophron (Plato's models) and by the gnomic trend of Doric thought, they were

approved and studied by Aristotle, but considered vulgar and old-fashioned by Isocrates. In Plato they are most abundant in the *Lys.*, *Charm.*, *Euthyd.*, *Symp.* and *Phaedr.*, all dramatic and familiar in tone; then in the *Theaetetus* and *Phil.*, then in the *Gorgias* and *Laws*, the first three blending the serious with the dramatic, the last counteracting its stiffness by a strong Doric color; and finally in *Euth'o*, *Phaedo* and *Repub.*, where the elevation of tone somewhat overrides dramatic tendencies. Out of 274 occurrences of 188 proverbs, 144 are put in the mouth of Socrates, 56 are used by his interlocutors, and 74 appear in *Leg.*, *Soph.* and *Polit.*, where he does not participate. In the *Gorgias*, Socrates employs 13, a number slightly below his ratio, and Chaerephon *one*, while the two sophists do not stoop at all to such vulgarity (v. p. 6). Callicles again shows his neutrality by using three, slightly more than his share.

Likewise familiar and old-fashioned is the *figura etymologica*, which Isocrates seems consequently to avoid. Dionysius (*De Admir. Vi*, 27), in his critique of the *Menexenus*, recognizes the vulgarity of the figure, saying οὐκ οἶδα εἴ τις ἂν ἡξίωσεν εἰπεῖν τῶν τὴν λεπτὴν καὶ ἀκριβῆ καὶ καθαρὰν διάλεκτον ἐπιτηδεύοντων· πράττεται γὰρ τὰ πράγματα, ἐργάζεται δὲ τὰ ἔργα. Kühner¹ thinks that the more pleonastic forms (as οἰκίαν οἰκοδομεῖν) have been taken into literary language from popular speech. In studying the use of this figure in Plato we must recognize a "doubtful" class, consisting of the combination of a participle and verb (as ὁ ποιεῶν ποιεῖ and ποιεῖν τὸ ποιούμενον) and the use with a *neuter* relative (as ποιεῖ δὲ ποιεῖ), which are deliberate and more exact forms of speech, and serve the needs of philosophic definition. The phrase ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν has been excluded, as being too common to give color. All kinds are found in the *Gorgias*, cases where the noun is in the nomin., accus., dat., and even genitive absolute (458 C, 513 C), and where the relative takes the place of the noun. Socrates employs 75 (87 per cent), or, excluding the doubtful class, 53 (46 per cent). This indicates that he owes his large proportion mainly to the use of definition and to exactness of speech. Chaerephon has it twice, the sophists more sparingly (one each), and Callicles less than his share (8). In seven Socratic² dialogues (322 pp.) the ratio per page is .59, without the doubtful, .36, of which Socrates has .47 and .26, while in four

¹Griech. Grammatik, 1086, 2.

²Prot., Lach., *Euth'o*, *Gorg.*, *Crito*, *Lys.*, *Meno*.

late¹ dialogues (320 pp.) it is .49 and .34. This inconveniently large proportion in the late dialogues is mainly due to the *Laws*, where the exact legal tone and a certain rejuvenescence of dramatic art at the beginning may be responsible. Out of the dialogues examined, the largest proportion is in the *Crito*, then *Laws XI*, then *Gorgias*. In the *Symposium* Socrates has 36 per cent and 14 per cent of the whole number, and Pausanias alone approaches him with 18 per cent and 14 per cent. Here the philosopher only exceeds the sophist by the use of definition. Its frequency in the *Memorabilia* (48 and 34 cases) seems to show that it *was* a favorite usage of Socrates, while the statistics from Plato indicate that the latter became scarcely less devoted to it than his master.

One of the most striking idiosyncrasies of Socrates is his great fondness for oaths.² Two forms seem to have been his favorites: *νῆ τῆν Ἥραν* (449 D), which is properly a woman's oath, is found in Xenophon as well, and Professor Gildersleeve has suggested that he borrowed from his mother, together with her maieutic art, of which Hera, through her daughter Eilethyia, was patron. It is also used by others.³ The second, the famous Rhadamanthine *νῆ (μὰ) τὸν χύνα* (461 B, 66 C) is due to the euphemism, which goes a step further in the elliptic *μὰ τὸν* (466 E), and is explained (482 B) by the addition *τὸν Αἰγυπτίων θεόν* (Anubis). Beside the above, we have *πρὸς Διός, φίλιου, θεῶν; ναὶ (μὰ) Δία*, and the jesting *μὰ τὸν Ζῆθον* (489 E). The free use of interjections also bears witness to his lively and easy style. He cries out *ιού, ιού* (499 C, cf. *Rep.* 432 D). Just two-thirds of the (18) interjections in Plato (Ast) are uttered by Socrates, *βαβαί* being the favorite (7). Others use the same words. The skilful dialectician often repeats the phrases of his opponents in his own arguments, turning their sharpest weapons against his foes. (462 B) *ἐμπειρία* from 448 C, (475 D) *ὅπὸ πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων* from 474 B, (506 C) *οὗτος ἀνὴρ* from 489 B, (518 A) *ἀνελευθέρους, δουλοπρεπεῖς*, 485 B, (526 E) *ὀνειδίζω σοι* κτλ., answers 486 A-C; *ἀντιπαραχαλῶ* answers 485 E and 521 A; (527 D) *νεανιεύεσθαι* answers 482 C, and *ὅποῖον δοκῇ* κτλ., answers 466 C ff. With like *ἀτοπία* (*Symp.* 215 A), he ironically quotes their statements. (460 A) *ὥσπερ εἶπες, ἀποκαλύψας* (455 D), (462 E, 509 A), *ἀγροικότερον* (461 C), (506 B) *τῆν Ἀμφίονος ῥῆσιν* from

¹ *Soph.*, *Pol.*, *Crit.*, *Leg.* I-III, XI.

² v. Schanz, *Nov. Comm. Plat.* 18 ff.

³ *Xen. Conv.* 3 times, *Lach.* 181 A, etc.

485 E, (519 D) *ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγορεῖν* from 482 C. This is really a sort of parody in a parody, which is still more evident in the assonance of (461 D) *ἐν ἔργοις καὶ ἐν λόγοις*, (465 D) *πολὺ . . . Πῶλε*, (467 B) *ὃ λῶσσε Πῶλε*, (461 C) *ὃ κάλλιστε Πῶλε*.

It has already been noted that in the language of all the other interlocutors there is but *one* case of anacoluth (p. 9). The speeches of Socrates, on the contrary, exhibit a very loose and careless style, which imitates the structure of easy conversation. We know that the philosopher disregarded the mere externals of language and system, and indeed he says himself (Symp. 199 B) that he speaks *ὀνόμασι δὲ καὶ θέσει ῥημάτων τοιαύτη, ὅποια δ' ἂν τις τύχῃ ἐπελθοῦσα*. This shows itself in loose, disjointed sentences like 459 E, 465 D, 493 AB, 501 A, 505 D *ἐπιθέντας*, 507 DE, 508 CD, 511 DE, 512 E f., 513 D, 17 E, 21 E, and in genuine anacoluths, 453 AB *ἐγὼ . . . ἐμέ*. 477 D (?), 454 B *ἵνα μὴ θαυμάζῃς*, 464 A, 503 D *τοῦτο δὲ τέχνη κτλ.*, 515 D *οὐκ ἴσως, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη*; 517 D *εἶναι . . . τοιοῦτον ὄντα*, 521 A *διακονήσοντα*;¹ also in the repetition of a word, as *διαπραττομένη* (511 D), *παρέλαβε* (516 B), in self-interruption (500 E), and in hyperbaton, *σώματι τῷ . . . γιγνομένῳ* (504 C), and *διαλέγεσθαι . . . πρὸς ἀλλήλους* (473 C). Here we may class the frequent brachylogy, as *τῇ νῦν <= τῷ τὴν νῦν λέγοντι >* (493 D), *ἄνευ <τοῦ φροντίζειν > τοῦ βελτίστου* (465 A), *πίνοντες παρά* for *τὸ διδύμενον ὑπὸ* (467 C), *ἀντὶ χειρόνων* for *τοῦ ποιεῖν χειρόνας* (515 D, cf. 516 C), and asyndeton, 455 B *ὅταν*, 464 B *δυοῖν* and *τὴν μέν*, 472 A *μαρτυρήσουσι*, 481 E *ἐν τε ἐκκλησίᾳ*, 487 B *τίνι*; also the awkward assonance or cacophony, as *οὐ οὔτοι* (451 D), *ἐγὼ ἐρῶ* (453 D, 504 C), *ἐγὼ λέγω* (470 E, 512 D, 518 A, 22 C), *φέγω ἐγὼ* (517 B), *ἐγὼ ἄγω* (494 E), *τί δὲ τόδε*; (474 D). Pleonasm and polysyndeton are much rarer, as (480 E) *τοῦναντίον αὐ μεταβαλόντα*, (482 B) *κρεῖττον . . . μᾶλλον*, (453 B) *ὀποπτεύω ἦν οἶμαι* (modesty), and (519 A) *καὶ λιμένων κτλ.*

Gathering from various indices 166 cases of anacoluth, in dialogues where Socrates participates, and 39 of brachylogy, he is found to have 84 per cent of each. Of course, these figures only show a general tendency, since they do not present *all* the cases, nor do we know Socrates' exact ratio in the other dialogues. This same carelessness of speech may be seen in the Memorabilia, as *ὀργίζεσθαι . . . λυπεῖ* (III 13, 1), II 1, 18, II 3, 2 *δύναται . . . ἀγνοοῦσι*, IV 2, 38 *ἐνίοις ἀρχεῖ . . . ἀλλὰ περιποιῶνται*.

The same work shows us that Socrates was accustomed to

¹ See also Engelhardt, Anacoluth. Platon. I 28-34.

quote from the poets for illustration or support in his discussions. We have there citations from Homer, Hesiod, Theognis and Epicharmus, and he evinces considerable familiarity with poetry. His friend Niceratus in the *Convivium* (IV 7, VII 45) was a good Homeric scholar, and he was on intimate terms with the poet Agathon (id. VIII 32). Accordingly we are not surprised to find him quoting in our dialogue from Homer, Simonides (? 451 E), Epicharmus, and Euripides. His intimacy with the last named is well known.¹ We may also infer from *Apol.* 22 B and *Prot.* 339 ff. that he was fairly well versed in the poets, but it is doubtful that he was really acquainted with all the 21 from whom Plato makes him quote, and, indeed, as it stands, his percentage (65) is not very high. Out of some 220 citations, or direct references, from the poets, Socrates has 145, of which about half (70) are from Homer. In both Xenophon and Plato, Socrates uses many rare words, but it is probable that they are due chiefly to the authors themselves, as this is characteristic of their style and foreign to the simple nature of their master.² One word, however, *δικαιότης* (508 A), as it only occurs elsewhere (till Cassius Dio) in *Prot.* 331 B (*Soc. loq.*) and three times in Xenophon, may perhaps be Socratic. In the *Gorgias*, Socrates has 79½ per cent of the *ἄπαξ λεγόμενα*, only a trifle more than his share; Callicles and *Gorgias* are below their ratio, *Polus* above. Although Xenophon puts metaphors and similes into the mouth of Socrates, he was not enough of a dramatic artist to imitate so closely the usage of his master, and, though they abound in the sayings quoted by *Stobaeus*, many of these citations are of doubtful authenticity. On the other hand, from their poetic nature and their great increase in the later dialogues, we may infer their Platonic origin (cf. *Demetr.* 281, 3 Sp.). However, the comparison *τῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ ἰατρῷ παρέχειν* (475 D, 480 C), which recurs in the *Memorabilia* (I 2, 54), and the metaphorical use of *θήρα* and *θηρεύω* (464 D, 490 A, 500 E), which is found not only in Xenophon (*Mem.* II 6, III 11, 7 f.), but also in a dictum quoted by *Stobaeus* (*Flor.* I 116), seem likely to have been favorite expressions.

There only remain a few figures, which do not seem Socratic, nor yet directly satirical, but rather borrowed from the very sophists whom he opposed. Cicero says (*De Orat.* I 47): "< Plato in *Gorgia* > in oratoribus irridendis ipse esse orator summus vide-

¹ *Diog. L.* II 18; *Cic. Tusc.* IV 29.

² Cf. *Rep.* 487 E, *σύ γε οὐκ εἰώθας δι' εἰκόνων λέγειν*.

batur," and Dionysius (Ad Pomp. 2), *σχήμασι* . . . *μάλιστα τοῖς Γοργείοις* . . . *αναβρύνεται* and further *ζηλώσας τοὺς περὶ Γοργίαν*. For some of these sophistic figures see van Prinsterer (p. 104), and on the whole subject of Platonic rhetoric, Novák (pp. 500–521). In this dialogue we find the metaphors and similes previously mentioned, as *νόσημα ἀδικίας—ὑπουλον* (480 B, cf. 479 B), *χρυσῇ φυγῇ* κτλ. (486 D), *λόγῳ ἐπεξέρχει* (492 D) and *ἐπιχειρῶμεν* (495 C), *μεμῆσθαι τὰ μεγάλα* (497 C), *ἀναθέσθαι* and *ἐπ' ἀνόρθου* (461 D), *σκοπὸς* . . . *συντείνοντα* (507 D), *σιδηροῖς καὶ ἀδαμαντίνους λόγους* . . . *λύσει* (509 A), *καταχώσειν λόγους* (512 C), *ρήτορες* . . . *ἐξέπεσον* (517 A), *καθέρξης* (461 D), *ἐπιψηφίζων* (474 A, 76 A), and in similes (481 DE) the two *δῆμοι*, *ὥσπερ παισὶ* (502 E), *ἐμπλήσαντες τὸ ὕγιενον* (518 C); 493 A–E are borrowed. Other comparisons come under the head of examples (p. 23). Add also the artistic assonance, *φιλίαν καὶ κοσμιότητα καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιοσύνην* (508 A); the strong personification *τέχνας* . . . *δεσποίνας* (518 A), *ἡ κολαευτικὴ αἰσθημένη* . . . *ὑποδῶσα* (464 C), (505 D) *μῦθος* . . . *ἄνευ κεφαλῆς περιίη*, < *ἡ κυβερνητικὴ* > *οὐ σεμνύνεται ἐσχηματισμένη* (511 D) < *πόλις* > *οἶδεῖ καὶ ὑπουλός* (518 E), *ἡρεμεῖ ὁ λόγος* (527 B), *ὥσπερ ἡγεμόνι τῷ λόγῳ* (527 E); and the alliteration *πλέουσιν, πλουτεῖν· πλούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα πλέουσιν* (467 D) and *πνίγων ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ, πικρότατα πώματα* . . . *πεινῇν*. Perhaps also the frequent annominatio may be due to this influence. Though anaphora is very common in the Memorabilia, it seems unlikely a priori that it was really much used by Socrates. Here we find *οὗτος* (510 C) and *πολιτικός* (513 B). While chiasm is more or less natural (to the Greek), some of the more artistic forms, which we encounter here, seem due to rhetorical training. (Cf. 467 D *πλέουσι*, 481 D *Ἀλκιβιάδης*, 493 C *ἀπλήστως*, 497 C *λυπῶν*, 500 E *δφουοῖα*, 522 A *ἰσχαίνων*, B *ποιῶντα*.)

B.—His Character.

If one feature of Socrates' character stands out in bolder relief than another, it is his modesty, real or assumed. He ironically professes to be entirely ignorant and sorely in need of instruction.¹ Olymp. notes that (454 A) in *εἰ τίς με ἔροιτο* Socrates refers the fault to himself, and not to Gorgias, while in *ἐλεγχε καὶ ἐλέγχου* (462 A) he admires the *μέτριον ἥθος* in the modest order of the words (cf. B. *ἐρώτα ἢ ἀποκρίνου*). In the same line is his naïveté *καὶ ἐγὼ* (454 B), *φῶμεν ἢ μὴ φῶμεν*; (480 D), and euphemism *ἢ ἔτι*

¹ 453 B, A, 55 B, 58 E, 62 E, 74 A, 88 A; cf. Memor. I, 2, 34.

τί σε ἐρωτῶ (494 E). His deep religious feeling, which is so manifest in the *Apol.*, *Crito* and *Phaedo*, appears throughout the closing myth. By the phrase *παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς παρέλαβον* (523 A), he reverently avoids allusion to the enmity of Zeus and Kronos, and he refers the guidance of his own life to God (512 E, cf. *Apol.* 41 D, *Cr.* 54 E). Consequently he maintains his private judgment against all authority of man (472 AB, 88 A f., 526 D, cf. *Apol.* 29 C, *Cr.* 44 C, etc.). That enmity to the democracy which hastened his death crops out in the references to his fate (p. 3), in his condemnation of the statesmen (515 B ff.), and in the parallel of the two fickle *δῆμοι* (481 D ff.).

II.—*His Philosophy.*

A. *Sources.*—The discussion of the sources of Socratic philosophy lies outside the province of this treatment. One class of scholars, chief of whom are Hermann, Grote and Überweg, prefers the testimony of Xenophon to that of Plato, while another, represented by Schleiermacher (Berlin Acad. 1818), Brandis and practically Zeller, claims greater fidelity for Plato, but makes use also of Xenophon and Aristotle. This correct position Wytténbach thus summarizes, "In Xenophonte imago Socratis; in Platone ipse Socrates." Fouillée (Paris, 1874) and others aptly remark that Plato presents the ideal (*εἶδος*) Socrates, and Schleiermacher thinks that the philosopher is faithfully and artistically portrayed, but as the method and spirit of Socrates sway all the thought of his pupil, Plato puts in his mouth what he believed to be the consequences of his teaching, as well as the teaching itself. It is generally agreed that *Symp.* 215–222 was intended to be a true description of the character and method of the philosopher (cf. *Hermog.* 372, 12 Sp.), and Brandis mentions *Prot.*, *Lach.*, *Meno*, *Char.*, *Gorg.* as those dialogues which most faithfully set forth his teachings. Most scholars would add the *Apol.* and *Crito*. The *Prot.* and *Gorgias* especially resemble the *Memorabilia* in the fuller and more independent answers given by the interlocutors, and even Hermann says that our dialogue exhibits "ganz Sokratische Dialektik."

B. *The method* of Socrates' dialectic presents two sides, positive and negative. The latter shows, by means of critical examples, the change and contradiction of opposing ideas, and their consequent untruth. This so-called irony appears in 490 C–E

and 494 C-E, while 514 DE gives the *reductio ad absurdum*. Allusion is made to this treatment in the *Memorabilia* (I 4, 1, IV 2, 39). The positive side, *maieutic*, directs attention to the universal necessity and real nature of things by means of induction and definition. The first step in induction is the example, which is generally drawn from the most ordinary spheres of action. Calicles objects to its vulgarity (491 A, 97 C), and so did Critias (Xen. Mem. I 2, 37, cf. Sym. 221 E, Ar. Nub. 385 f.). Socrates himself (Xen. Oec. XVII 15) speaks of the advantage of the method.

In the *Gorgias* we have shoemakers (447 E), weavers (49 D), painters (53 E), physicians (467 C, 77 E f., 79 A), merchants (67 D, 77 E f., 518 B), foolish boys (497 E), poets, flute and lyre players (501 E ff.), statesmen (503 C, 15 D ff.), pilots (11 D), engineers (512 BC), cattle-trainers (516 A, cf. Xen. Mem. I 2, 32), charioteers (16 E), cooks (18 B), and teachers of gymnastics (520 C). Moreover, the choice of various public officials (455 B) and the nature of sickness (496 A) are adduced. The inductive process naturally follows closely and applies these examples (cf. Xen. Mem. IV 6, 15). It is illustrated most forcibly in the final reduction of the argument with Polus (474 DE, 76 C-E, 78 B), and in the clinching of the refutation of Calicles (496 C-E, 98 B, E ff.). Expressions like (498 E) *συλλόγισαι τί συμβαίνει* (cf. 496 E) *ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων* (cf. 476 D, 80 A) indicate the consummation of the process. Often, though not always, the result of induction is definition (Xen. Mem. IV 6, Ar. Met. XIII 4), which is necessary to the full and exact knowledge demanded by Socrates. First we find rhetoric defined (447 D-53 A) by Gorgias, then persuasion (53 B-55 A), then rhetoric again by Socrates (462 C-66 A). Power (470 B), honor (474 E), punishment (76 A) and happiness (73 D) have each its place, while the stronger and the better (488 D, 89 E), good and bad pleasures are carefully distinguished (495 A-500 A). The words *ὑπὸς* and *(δι)ὑπὸρίζομαι* (as 470 B, 75 A, 88 D, 95 A, 513 D) or *διαίρῃω* (495 C) often point to this stage of the discussion.

Besides these fundamental principles, certain external devices are employed. (1) An imaginary objector, or questioner, is introduced, who usually represents the general public (cf. Prot. 311 D, 12 D, 30 C, 53 A-56 E, Symp. 200 CD). In this dialogue *ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἔροιτο* (451 A, C, 54 D), *εἴποι ἂν ὁ ἱατρός* (452 A-C), *νόμισον ὅπ' ἐκείνων ἀνερωτᾶσθαι* (452 D) mark the query and implied objection. This is more polite (and more forcible) than

to make the criticism directly, and is therefore employed against Gorgias alone. (2) The speaker may quote the previous statements of his opponents, in order to be certain that they are rightly understood (cf. Prot. 349 BC, 59 AB, Xen. Mem. IV 6, 14). The formulae employed are ἐρρήθη ταῦτα ἢ οὐ; (460 D), οὐκ ἄρτι ἔλεγες; (466 D, 88 E), εἴπεις; (73 D), φῆς; (92 D, 98 E), κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον (88 E), οὐτῶ σου νομίζοντος (72 D), ἢ ὁρθῶς μέμνημαι; (88 B, cf. 95 D). The requisites for discussion are three, ἐπιστήμη, εὐνοία, παρρησία (487 A, cf. Lach. 178 AB with 181 D), and the purpose of dialectic is the discovery of truth. Hence Socrates is ready ἐλέγχειν or ἐλέγχεσθαι, whichever will attain this object, and this position he carefully states to *each* successive interlocutor (458 AB, 62 A, 506 A, C; cf. Char. 166 B.).

One factor of Platonic dialectic, division, is denied to Socrates by Brandis, his reasons being Aristotle's reference of the process to Plato alone, its prominence in the non-Socratic Sophistes and Politicus, and its close connection with the doctrine of ideas. Campbell, however, recognizes its *germ* in Socrates, while Fouillée holds that it is essential to definition, which is the result and union of induction and deduction, and cites the alphabetic classification of the Memorabilia (IV 2, 13 ff.). His deductions were inexact, and reached only probable results, since they rested on concrete classes (γένει; Mem. IV 6, 12), but Plato improved and systematized the process, basing it on transcendental concepts (εἶδη). However, even if the latter view be correct, such divisions as those of rhetoric and pleasure (463 E ff. and 474 E) seem too elaborate to have been made by Socrates. Such simpler forms as the two classes of persuasion (454 DE) and the recognition of good, bad and indifferent (468 A ff.) might be ascribed to him more readily, and, indeed, the latter is more or less implied in the relative nature of good and evil (v. Mem. III 8, IV 2, 31-36).

C. *His Doctrines*.—This subject has been thoroughly treated by Brandis (Rh. Mus. 1827) and Ribbing (Upsala, 1870), and the larger part of the Gorgias they have incidentally attributed to Socrates. Upon examination of those portions of the dialogue not thus classified, the following are shown by comparison with Xenophon and the earliest Socratic dialogues (v. p. 22) to be the views of Socrates. (1) The identification of ἀγαθόν with ὠφελίμον (468 C, 75 A; Mem. IV 6, 8, Prot. 333 E) and with καλόν, and consequently κακόν with αἰσχροόν (474 D ff.; Mem. III 8, 7, IV 6, 9, Lys. 216 D). (2) The community of interest is essential to friend-

ship (507 E, 510 B; Mem. II 6, 21-23, Plato often). (3) The chief aim of the statesman must be the benefit of the state, not personal power (510 D-11 A, 13 E, 15 C, 17 C; Mem. III 2: 6, 3 ff.). (4) The statesman must have previous training (514 B-E; Mem. III 6: 9, 10, IV 2, 2). (5) The good can suffer no harm (527 D; Apol. 41 D). (6) Moderate eating is essential to health (518 CD; Mem. III 13, 2: 14). The argument (480 B-81 B) that punishment should be sought for guilty friends, but kept from guilty enemies, is merely an extension of the results of the preceding discussion, and though itself not directly comparable with other views of the philosopher, it is quite in the Socratic spirit. While the precise distinction of *κρείττων* and *βελτίων* (488 C) is not found elsewhere, and Socrates seems to use them interchangeably in the Prot. (358 C), the differentiation of *γενέσθαι* and *εἶναι* in the same dialogue (340 BC), and Socrates' frequent claim to be the pupil of Prodicus (Prot. 341 A, Mem. II 1, 21, etc.) make it not improbable that the distinction is his own. Moreover, this is an essential of definition. The discrimination of *ἡδύ* and *ἀγαθόν* (497 A, D), and the difficulty of separating good and bad pleasures (500 A), are *implied* in the Memorabilia (IV 2, 35, 36, cf. Lys. 221 A, B). Socrates emphasizes the great value of geometric balance of character, and of geometry in general (508 A), but in the Memorabilia (IV 7, 2, 3) he condemns any careful study of the science. The defenders of Platonic testimony discredit the statement of Xenophon, and, indeed, the neglect of systematic knowledge is contrary both to the liberal Socratic spirit and to true philosophy. The pupil of such a teacher would hardly write above his door, *μηδεὶς ἀγεωμέτρητος εἰσίστω*.

The acquaintance of Socrates with the views and systems of previous philosophers is evinced by the summary which he makes in the Memorabilia (I 1, 14). In the Gorgias he cites two mythical comparisons (493 A f.), which go back, ultimately at least, to the Pythagoreans.¹ Even if they are taken from Empedocles (Olymp.), or Heraclitus (Schuster), it is probable that they merely borrowed them from the Pythagoreans, upon whom they were largely dependent. The same may be said of the theory of cosmic harmony (507 E), whose *φιλία* suggests the *φιλότης* of the Sicilian. Pythagorean influences are more apparent in the later dialogues, and it is doubtful that Socrates made much use of this system. The quotation from Anaxagoras (465 D) is quite con-

¹ v. Hirzel, Comm. hon. Momms., p. 11.

sistent with Socrates' knowledge, for in the *Memorabilia* (IV 7, 6, 7) he criticizes by name the views of that philosopher, and in the *Phaedo* (97 B) states that he had listened to the reading of one of his books. The closing myth shows considerable familiarity with the Orphic hymns, of which Socrates could not have been wholly ignorant. The poetic coloring and rhetorical nature, however, point to Plato, and the myth, as an integral part of dialectic, was one of his most characteristic creations. Xenophon and the earliest dialogues show no trace of its employment by Socrates, and Plato, perhaps again under sophistic influence, first used it as an engine of philosophic thought (v. Hirzel, 74, Novák, 502 f.)

